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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I .
CAN THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA BE USED TO BAR A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT?
II.
IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE A
JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD A PROPER PROCEDURE?
III.
IS THIS ACTION BROUGHT FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING
DEFENDANT, OR IS THERE A FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM?
IV.
CAN PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BE BARRED BY THE DIVORCE ACTION?
V.
ARE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY BARRED?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns the issue of

whether a prior divorce

action between the parties is res judicata or a bar to a subsequent
action by the wife against her husband for acts occurring after
the divorce, i.e. intentional

inflication of emotional distress

(First Cause of Action), and whether she is entitled to maintain
an independent action in equity to set aside the divorce judgment
because of extrinsic fraud and set aside fraudulent conveyances
entered into by her husband prior to the divorce trial.
Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action).
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(Second,

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss in the lower court.
The Honorable Robert J. Bullock treated it as a Motion for Summary
Judgment and granted

it on the ground that the prior action

was Res Judicata.
Appellant urges that this court reverse the granting of
the Summary Judgment and remand this case for pre-trial proceedings,
discovery and trial on the issues raised by the Complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a Civil Action, filed

in the Fourth Judicial District

Court of Utah County, Civil No. 58,518, the plaintiff-appellant,
Elizabeth Joanna Knight, sought a divorce from the defendantrespondent, John B. Knight.
After a trial a decree of divorce was entered, dividing
property between the parties and establishing alimony.
After the divorce had been granted appellant learned that
the respondent had committed extrinsic fraud outside of, and
prior to, the trial which had deprived her of the opportunity
to present her claim.

The fraud consisted of the following

acts:
1.

destroying or secreting evidence;

2.

preventing appellant from gaining full and accurate
knowledge of his total assets and income;

3.

cheating, imposing upon, or dealing with appellant
in a manner that shocks the conscience;

4.

conveying his property to 3rd persons prior to the
di vorce tr ial ;

3

5.

secretly holding unrecorded conveyances;

6*

giving purjured testimony during discovery proceedings.

These acts were designed to deprive, and had the effect
of depriving, appellant of a fair opportunity to present her
claims for property and alimony

in the divorce proceedings.

In addition, fo11owing the divorce action, respondent engaged
in an outrageous course of conduct which was intended to and
did humiliate appellant*

It was done with callous disregard

for her feelings and for the purpose of "getting even" with
her and punishing her, and for

the purpose of causing her great

mental suffering and emotional distress.
As a result of this conduct the appel lant filed an independent
action in equity against respondent.
and distinct causes of action.

They

It contained five separate
are:

1.

For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

2.

To Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances;

3.

For Conspiracy (conspiring with others to do the things

stated in the first two causes of action);
4.

To Modify, Vacate or Set Aside Judgment; obtained

by Fraud, and for Damages;
5.

For an Equitable Division of Marital Property.

Respondent

filed a Motion to Dismiss which was treated

by the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment.

He contended

that the new action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata
for the reason that all

issues raised in the new pleadings had
4

been

litigated

in the prior divorce action.

issued Summary Judgment on that ground.

The lower Court

(See Addendum,

pages 1-4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA MAY NOT BE USED
TO BAR A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT
The lower court held that an independent action in equity
to set aside a prior judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud
was barred by the prior action for the reason that it is an
attempt to relitigate the issues tried
If that

in the prior action.

is true then no independent action

aside a prior judgment could ever be brought.

in equity to set
No prior judgment,

if rendered by fraud or collusion, can be used to sustain a
claim of res judicata.
II .
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE
A JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD IS A PROPER PROCEDURE
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) permit an independent
action

in equity to set aside a prior judgment for fraud upon

the Court.
The case was properly pled.

It is not appropriate for

the lower court to grant a Summary Judgment when there are facts
in dispute.

5

III.
THIS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT
FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING DEFENDANT—THERE IS A
FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
There is a factual basis for Plaintiff's claim, and through
appropriate pre-trial

discovery the Plaintiff believes that

she will discover other evidence to support her contentions.
IV.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY
THE DIVORCE ACTION
Plaintiff's claim for intentional

infliction of emotional

distress is based in part on acts occurring before the divorce
trial and in part on acts occurring after.

Obviously the divorce

could not have litigated the issues arising out of the acts
of defendant occurring after the divorce was concluded; and,
as to the former acts the divorce

is not res judicata either

for the reasons that the issues involved in an intentional inf 1 iction
of emotional
a divorce.

distress case are
The elements of

different than the issues in

the tort are

different than for

a divorce.
V.
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY ARE NOT BARRED
If the plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment set aside
then her causes of action to set aside fraudulent conveyances
and for conspiracy are

not barred.

They furnish the mechanisms

to bring third parties who participated
6

in the fraud before

the court, to force reconveyances, and to allow Plaintiff complete
reli ef•
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA MAY NOT BE USED
TO BAR A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE FORMER JUDGMENT
The very definition of res judicata "is that an existing
final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or col 1 us ion,
by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes
of action and of facts or issues thereby

litigated . . ." 46

Am Jur 2d Judgments Section 394 (1969) (emphasis added).

"In

stating the doctrine of res judicata, the Courts frequently
refer

to the fact that the judgment sought to be used as a basis

for the application of the doctrine must have been rendered
without fraud or collusion, since it is generally held that
the principles of res judicata may not be invoked to sustain
fraud, and that a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may
not be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of
res judicata."

46 Am Jur 2d Judgments, Section 473 (1969).

Defendant-Respondent's

bootstrap argument, made to the

lower court, to the effect that a prior adjudication bars a
subsequent action to set aside that prior adjudication, assumes
its own conclusion.

The argument could only have merit if the

prior action were not taken by fraud, but that is the very issue
which the second action attempts to litigate.

"A judgment does

not import absolute verity, and is not regarded as conclusive,

7

where

it is being subjected to a direct attack."

46 Am Jur

2d Judgments, Section 381 (1969).
The basic thrust of Plaintiff's FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
is to set aside the prior judgment on the ground that it was
taken by fraud.

Defendant assumes his own conclusion when he

argues that the prior judgment precludes this action, for if
that were the case no one could ever attack a former judgment.
II .
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE
A JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD IS A PROPER PROCEDURE
Plaintiff's FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

is governed by Rule

60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court
may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment
for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; . . ."
The section goes on to state:
"This Rule does not limit the power of a Court to
entertain an i ndependent act i on to relieve a party
from a judgment order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the Court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent
action." (emphasis added).
Just as in most other states, Utah recognizes that a party
wishing to set aside a judgment may proceed in an independent
action in equity.

Liebhardt v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 Pac. 215

(1912); Masbv v. Gisborn, 17 Utah 257, 54 Pac. 121 (1898); see
also, Glover v. Glover, Utah, 242 P.2d, 298 (1952) (in which
8

an independent action in equity was suggested as the preferred
procedure)•
A.

The Fourth Cause of Action States a Claim Upon Which

Relief Can Be Granted
In the case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 242, P.2d
298 (1952), the husband persuaded the wife to quitclaim real
property to him two days before their divorce

went to tria)

,

allegedly "for purposes of convenience" in selling the property.
He promised to sel1 it and split the proceeds with her.
Relying upon the husband's representations, the wife did
not mention the property
not included

in the divorce proceedings.

in the settlement agreement or embodied

It was
in the

decree.
Time passed and

it became apparent that the husband had

no intentions of selling the property.

Finally the wife brought

an action to modify the divorce decree to require her husband
to pay her a sum equal to one-half the value of the property
or to impose a constructive trust on her share of the property.
The issue was whether the alleged act of fraud was of a
type that would permit the wife to challenge the decree.
The court reiterated the familiar rule that judgments or
decrees can only be assai]ed

on direct

appeal or in equity for

extrinsic as contra-distinguished from intrinsic, fraud.
299.

J_d.. at

Further the court said, "extrinsic fraud must consist

of some act ulterior to the merits of the proceeding out of
which the judgment arose, by which the party attacking the judgment
9

was prevented from presenting his case or was induced not to
present it. Such fraud consists of something done by the successful
party, preventing the adverse party from presenting all of his
case to the court, so that there was, in fact, no adversary
trial or decision of the issue in that case."

Id, at 299.

Applying those principles to the facts of the case, the
court ruled for the wife, saying that because of the false promise
of a compromise there had never been a real contest in the trial,
[citing U. S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L.Ed.3d. 93
in turn was cited

(1878), which

in In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182

P. 2d 111, 118 (1947)].

Because of the wife's reliance on the

husband's false promise, her rights in the property were never
1itigated.
The next major Utah case where these issues were discussed
was Haner v. Haner, 13 U. 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962).
was a divorce action
judgment

on the

Haner

in which the wife sought to set aside a

ground

that

her

husband

had

made

false

representations in procuring the divorce decree.
The court' stated the law in such a way that it appeared
that the extrinsic-intrinsic dichotemy was being abolished:
"It is sometimes said that when a judgment is attacked collaterally
on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or deceit it will
be set aside only for extrinsic fraud.

But we are

in accord

with the indications in the Restatement of Judgments that -this
is too limited.

It seems more realistic to say that when it

appears that the processes of justice has been so completely
10

thwarted or distorted as to persuade the court that in fairness
and good conscience the judgment should not be permitted to
stand, relief should be granted."
But then the court explained that the doctrine was still
alive in cases where the only fraud complained of occurred inside
the courtroom:

"However, inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems

to be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a distinction
which it is necessary to point out.

In order to justify granting

rel ief, the al leged wrong would have to be of the type characterized
as extrinsic fraud:

that is, fraud based on conduct or activities

outside of the court proceedings themselves; and which is designed
and has the effect of depriving the other party of the opportunity
to present his claim or defense."
The court further explained that the type of fraud

which

would justify setting aside a decree is accomplished in a number
of ways, one of which is "by destroying or secreting evidence."
id. at 579.
Having

identified the applicable

court went on to hold

legal principles, the

in favor of the husband on the ground

that the gist of the wife's case was that at the trial her husband
had lied about her associations with other men, and placed erroneous
values on the properties.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has applied these principles
in two cases which are

practically

bar.

i 1

identical to the case at

The first of these
(1980).

is Boyce v. Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928

That was a divorce case in which the wife sought relief

from a decree on the basis that her husband had fraudulently
misrepresented the extent and the value of his assets in persuading
her to enter into a settlement.
The husband's claim was that she had the opportunity to
evaluate the information he had given her before agreeing to
the settlement and stipulating to the decree based thereon.
The court ruled for the wife, saying that "the property
settlement may be inequitable and an affront to our judicial
system because of the possibility of fraud on the plaintiff
and the court.
It appears that the assets of the parties may be five times
the amount disclosed by defendant at the time of the settlement
agreement.

The record lends support to plaintiff's contention

that defendant prevented plaintiff from gaining full and accurate
knowledge of his total assets by transferring corporate holdings
to family members without relinquishing control of those assets,
by understanding (sic-understating?) the true value of jointly-held
property, and by avoiding compliance with court-ordered discovery."
id. at 930.
The court concluded that "the determination of what assets
are

subject

to the divorce proceeding may not be based on

gamesmanship calculated to obfuscate the facts; the judicial
system

is not to be manipulated

12

in divorce proceedings by one

who actively and aggressively misleads the court and the opposing
party."

Jjd. at 931 .

The second recent case is McBride v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d
431 (1980).

In McBride the wife instituted supplemental proceedings

in a divorce action to modify the decree on the ground that
the husband had deceived her about the value of family property.
The husband countered with a motion for summary dismissal contending
that the rights of the parties had been settled in the decree.
In effect the husband's argument was the same as the one the
defendant urges here.
The trial court granted the husband's motion and dismissed
the case, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying:
for Summary dismissal

"a Motion

can properly be granted only when, even

assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved against to
be true, he could not prevail."

_Ld. at 432.

Basically it was the husband's argument that "if any fraud
existed, it was intrinsic fraud and not available as a ground
for

disturbing the decree."

this argument

The Supreme Court's response to

is somewhat lengthy, but bears quotation because

of its applicability to the case at bar:
"We acknowledge awareness and appreciation of the
cases cited and relied upon by the plaintiff to the
effect that intrinsic fraud will not usually be grounds
for setting aside a judgment. The reasoning is to
the effect that intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which
occurs during and within the proceedings, so that
a party exercising reasonable diligence could meet
and have an adjudication thereon, will not justify
relief from a judgment.
Whereas, it is held that
the only type of fraud which will justify granting
relief from a judgment is extrinsic fraud, that is,
the deception or misrepresentation was outside the
13

proceedings and effectively prevented the party from
meeting and having the issue determined.
It is not to be doubted that, in appropriate
circumstances, there may be merit to the just-stated
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud,
and the allowance of a belated collateral attack upon
a judgment only for the latter. The principal reason
for this is that there must be some end to litigation;
and to serve that purpose, the findings and judgment
on issues previously tried to triable should have
respect and solidarity; and this includes all matters
which could, with reasonable diligence, have been
presented and resolved in the trial. And for that
reason a judgment should not be disturbed except for
compelling reasons where the interests of justice
so demand.
The other side of that proposition is
that the courts should not forsake the interest of
justice; and when it appears that an egregious deception
or oppression may have been practiced, it should neither
be condoned nor rewarded.
Particularly, that this
should not be done by allowing one to seek refuge
in niceties of legal terminology.
Consistent with that principle, though we remain
committed to the desirability of respecting judgments
and preserving their solidarity, we have heretofore
recognized that it is more important to give consideration
to the degree of the injustice that may have resulted
than to terminology or labels as to th,e type of fraud
alleged.
Accordingly, in a case such as this of
interfamily feuding, where the contentions make it
appear that there is a substantial likelihood that
the proof may show that a party was so cheated, imposed
upon, or unfairly dealt with that it should shock
the conscience of the court to allow it to stand,
the court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting
the parties to present their evidence and have the
issues determined." Id. at 432.
The Plaintiff herein, Joanna Knight, pleads, in her FOURTH
CAUSE OF ACTION that the defendant has engaged

in fraudulent

conduct similar to that in the Boyce and McBride cases, supra,
in that he fraudulently conveyed his property to third parties,
and secreted properties so that a fair trial of the issues was
effectively prevented.
is alleged,

These outs i de-of-court activities, it

included transferring properties while secretly
14

taking back unrecorded reconveyances.
her,

The effect was to cheat

impose upon her, and unfairly deal with her, and as a result

the processes of justice has been so completely thwarted or
distorted that

in fairness and good conscience the judgment

should not be permitted to stand.

Whether her evidence will

sustain those allegations is a matter which should be determined
at the time of trial, and not by a Motion to Dismiss.
B.

The Factual

Basis for Plaintiff's Claim of Fraud }s

Not Properly Tested By a Motion for Summary Judgment
In McBride, supra, the husband had also argued that "there
is no factual

basis for the [wife's] claim of fraud.'*

"The

court answered that contention summarily, pointing out that
the wife's correct and sufficient rejoinder is that the averments
of the parties are

in diametric disagreement, wherefore summary

dismissal could not properly be based on that ground, and that
the issue would have to be resolved on the basis of the credibility
of their respective evidence thereon."
Ill .
THIS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT
FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARRASSING DEFENDANT—THERE IS A
FACTUAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Defendant suggested, in his argument to the lower court,
that this matter is an example of a continuing effort to annoy
and harrass him.
counsel

That

is an argument about which Plaintiff's

is more than a little sensitive, because

it implies

that counsel would knowingly be a party of such conduct.

15

Lest there be any doubt as to whether there i s any substance
behind plaintiff's allegations, the following
A.

is presented:

Defendant cl aimed, during discovery proceedings that

he had no equity, ownership, interest or right to acquire the
house in which he was then and is now living:
On November

1, 1982, attorney

interrogatories to the defendant.

Don Peterson

submitted

Some of the questions referred

to the ownership of the house in which defendant was then living:
"1,

State the present address of the defendant.

ANSWER:
2.

870 East 3676 North, Provo, Utah.

State whether or not the defendant is renting or purchasing

the property where he is now residing.
ANSWER:
3.

Renting.

If the answer to the above-entitled

is that the defendant

interrogatory

is renting, state who is the owner of

the property and how much per month he pays rent.
ANSWER:
4.

Kilgore Corporation, $625.00 per month.

If the defendant

is purchasing the property where

he is residing or if he has an option to purchase the property,
state the purchase price of the amount of the option to purchase.
ANSWER:

None."

Attorney

Peterson

apparently

believed

that

the

defendant

was t e l l i n g

t h e t r u t h as he had been sworn t o d o .

Consequently,

he d i d

not

take

the

or

principals

the

the
in

depositions
Kilgore

of

the

seller

Corporation.

16

of
In

fact,

property
as

will

be shown below, defendant had lied in answer to the interrogatories,
and had thus thwarted plaintiff in her discovery attempts.
B.

Defendant

recorded a deed to the property

after the divorce trial.

shortly

Plaintiff moved for a new trial, urging

that defendant's mysterious acquisition of this property showed
that he had more financial

resources than he admitted to at

the trial. The defendant neatly sidestepped plaintiff's contentions
by submitted the following by sworn affidavit:
"(a) In the year

1981, Dorene Kilgore borrowed

a commission the sum of $15,500.00 from Tel urn, Inc.
employer).

against

(Respondent's

That amount of money was one-half of a commission

which was going to be due and owing to Mrs. Kilgore upon the
sale of a piece of property known as Argyle Ranch.

Because

of problems not caused by Mrs. Kilgore or Telum Corporation,
the ranch was never sold to Telum Corporation and therefore
the commission never came due.
the sum of $15,500.00.

Mrs. Kilgore owed Telum Corporation

Subsequent to the hearing of divorce

in the above-entitled action, Mrs. Kilgore approached me about
assuming the debt to Telum Corporation for $15,500.00 as and
for her equity and a down payment on the home.

I paid no cash

down on the home but merely assumed the obi i gat ion which Mrs. Ki 1 gore
had with Telum Corporation in the amount of $15,500.00.

I have

assumed the mortgage payments on the home which were substantially
identical

to the rent payment which I was then making.

aware of no equity

I am

in the said home and believe I have paid

a reasonable value for the home.
17

I still owe Telum Corporation

$15,500.00 which amount
no cash for the home.

I assumed for Mrs. Kilgore.

I paid

I testified freely and honestly with

regard to each and every asset which I owned on each and every
account that I maintained."
C.

Newly Discovered Evidence Shows that the Defendant

had Owned the House all along, and that his Former Testimony
was False
Following the parties' divorce trial, one Dorene Kilgore
gave a deposition under oath in Civil Action D81-4177, in the
District Court of Salt Lake County.
on September 27, 1982.

That deposition was given

It is quoted in the "Affidavit of Joanna

Knight in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss," signed on March 17,
1983 and filed in action number 63,129 on or shortly after that
date.

In it Mrs. Kilgore testified that from the very beginning

the house was bought by John Knight with his own money and put
in her name "because he didn't want to have it entered in his
divorce."

An affidavit concerning this testimony was before

the lower court when it ruled on the Summary Judgment.
an issue of fact that ought to be tried.

It discloses

If Mrs. Kilgore's

testimony is true, then it would support Appellant's Fourt Cause
of Action.
Q

(By Mr. Nemelka)

Let me show you what has been

marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you
can identify that.
A

Yes.

Q

Have you seen that document before?
18

A

Yes, of course.

Q

Would you tell us what it is.

A

It is the deed to the home in Provo.

Well, It

is in Orem.
Q

And that is a piece of property located in Provo,

Utah, or Orem?
A

Well, it is in Orem.

Q

Do you know the specific address of the property?

A

Let me think.

You have it in your things, Dick.

It is in the house on 870 East.

Okay.

Q

I don't have the address.

A

It

is on 870 East, and

approximately 3600 North.

I don't

know, it is

I don't remember the house's

address.
Q

Now, this document indicates that it was recorded

on August 28 of *81 .

Is that approximately the time when

the A

It was.

Q

wel1, that you recal1?

A

It was recorded when?

Q

August 28, 1981.

A

Yes.
Mr. LIAPIS:
Mr. NEMELKA:

Can we go off the record for a second?
Sure

(Off the record).
Q

(By Mr. Nemelka)

Go ahead, Mrs. Kilgore.
19

Do you recall that this property was conveyed to you
in approximately August of 1981?
A

Yes.

Q

And would you mind telling us the circumstances

under which the property was conveyed to you?
A

Define circumstances.

What do you mean?

Q

Why it was conveyed to you.

Did you pay some

consideration for it?
MR. LIAPIS:
this lot?

In other words, were you buying

Why is it in your name.
THE WITNESS:

Q

I bought the house.

(By Mr. Nemelka)

Okay.

And you bought the house

from Mr. and Mrs. Leach?
A

They were

represented by their attorney, who

was there, I have never met them.
Q

Okay.

All

right.

Was this Reed Benson their

attorney?
Y

Yes.

He had their attorney in fact.

Q

Do you recal 1 how much you bought the house from

them for?
A

One hundred five thousand dollars.

Q

Did you pay anything down on the house?

A

There were

fifteen thousand dollars put down

on it, yes.
Q

Was that your own personal money?

A

It was not.
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Q

Whose money was that?

A

It was John Knight's.

Q

John Knight's money?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you borrow that money from him?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Did he just give you the money?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Because I bought the house for him.
So you were buying the house for and on

behalf of Mr. Knight?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

Was t h e r e

name r a t h e r
A
his

than

any

reason

why

it

was p l a c e d

in

your

his?

Because

he

didn't

want

to

have

it

entered

In

divorce.
Q

at that

Because

he was g o i n g

through

a divorce

procedure

time?

A

Yes.

Q

Is this property still in your name?

A

No.

It wasn't—a day later it wasn't in my name.

I gave him a quitclaim deed the very same day this was
signed.
Q

I owned the home for about one hour.
Do you know whether in fact that quitclaim deed

has been recorded?
A
deed.

I know it has not.

He has since recorded a new

And that one was recorded in May.
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Q

Was that signed by you?

A

Yes.

Q

Is that a quitclaim deed or a warranty deed?

A

Quitclaim.

Q

Did he pay you any consideration for that?

A

No, he did not.

Q

House?

A

I did not own the house, Dick.

Q

Did you receive any commission for the sale of

the house?
A

No, 1 did not.

Q

So

equity

it is your testimony then that you had no

in the house at that time, nor do you have any in

the house today?
A

No."

It should be added at this point that the above testimony
is not the only evidence which plaintiff's counsel has which
would show that the defendant wrongfully withheld assets during
the divorce proceedings.

Plaintiff and counsel believe, and

hope to be able to confirm through extensive discovery, that
the defendant

is a person of considerable wealth

sufficient

to justify the large prayers for punitive damages in this action.
We believe that approximately seven years ago he defrauded a
bankruptcy court by falsely declaring he was a pauper, and that
in this case are

simply a repeat of that similar

in the earlier form.

It is earnestly submitted that

his actions
conduct
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when one takes the law into his own hands and abuses the orderly
admi nstrat i on of justice by engaging

in pre-trial

fraudulent

conveyances and secret transfers, whether in a bankruptcy court
or a divorce court, this is conduct which, in the words of the
Supreme Court, "shocks the conscience."
As stated

in McBr i de, "the court should resolve doubts

in favor of permitting the parties to present their evidence
and have the issues determined."

J[d. at 433.

IV.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY
THE DIVORCE ACTION
Prior to the divorce the parties lived in luxury.

Plaintiff

drove a Lincoln Continental, the family enjoyed a 26' Wellcraft
boat which was powered

by two

engines with

aircraft-type

superchargers so that it would travel almost 90 miles per hour,
the family had the unlimited use of a twin engine airplane worth
hundred of thousands of dollars, and they lived in a luxurious
home in Sherwood Hills.
than $200,000.00

The defendant admittedly earned more

in taxable

income the previous year.

They

lived in the "lap of luxury."
Then came the divorce.

Suddenly the defendant was lucky

to be employed at $30,000.00 a year.

Suddenly he could not

(or at least did not) keep up with the temporary support payments
of $3500.00 per month.

The family home was foreclosed and,

much to the humiliation and embarrassment of plaintiff, she
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and the children were out in the snow.

Now she is reduced to

trying to survive on $750.00 per month support.
P1 a i nt i ff be 1i eves:
1.
interest

That John Knight has substantial ownership and equity
in Tel urn, Inc., and related and affiliated companies.

He lied about

it during pre-trial discovery.

These interests

could be worth millions of dollars.
2.

That John Knight has income equal to the $200,000.00

a year reported for each of the years, 1980 and 1981, and continues
to earn that much or more.
3.

That John Knight owns substantial properties in Utah,

Arizona, and other states.
4.

That all of his property was accumulated during the

marriage of the parties.
5.

That John Knignt engaged

in "pre-divorce planning"

in which he transferred and conveyed properties to third parties
to "hold" for him; and that he divested himself of substantial
business and property

interests in avoid having to share them

with plaintiff.
6.

That after the divorce John Knight failed to pay the

support which had been ordered by the court and thereby allowed
the home in which appellant still lived to be foreclosed.
7.

That all of this was done not only to avoid having

to give plaintiff a fair share of the jointly acquired property,
but with callous disregard for

her feelings and for the purpose

of "getting even" with her and of hurting and punishing her,
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and even for the purpose of causing her great mental suffering
and emotional distress as well as humiliation and embarrassment.
Defendant's answer, as gleaned from his points and authorities
filed in support of his Motion to Dismiss, would be:
1.

That is not true.

2.

The subject of emotional

distress has already been

litigated in the divorce.
Plaintiff's reply, as to the first point, is that the question
of whether or not it is true is not a proper subject for a Summary
Judgment.

Only a trial can disclose whether plaintiff is correct.

She has properly pled her claim.

Now she is entitled to have

it heard.
As to the second point, this cause of action has not been
litigated in the divorce.

It culminated

in the failure to pay

support and the foreclosure of the house, which occurred after
the divorce.
A.

The Present Suit does not

involve the Same Claim,

Demand and Cause of Action
The elements of a cause of action for the intentional
infliction of emotional

distress are

outlined

in Sammo

v. Eccles, 11 Utah 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) in which the
court said that an action for severe emotional distress
lies:
1.

Where the defendant engaged in some conduct

toward the plaintiff;
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2.

the purpose of

With

inflicting

emotional

distress; or
3.

Where any reasonable person would have known

that such would result;
4.

And

his actions are

of such a nature as

to be considered outrageous and

intolerable in that

they offend against the generally accepted standards
of decency and morality.
B.

No

Id. at 374.

Issues were Adjudicated

in the Divorce so

as to Preclude the Successful Maintenance of the Plaintiff's
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
As stated above, this action does not

involve the

same claim, demand or cause of action as ,the divorce.
The elements are

different; hence the former suit does

not bar this suit.

Re:

West Jordan, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391,

362 P.2d 105 (1958).
But Defendant says that the i ssues of mental anguish
and distress were litigated in the divorce—that they were
a)ready

"discussed" there.

It is true that these

issues were discussed

in the

divorce, but only for the purpose of determining whether
grounds for divorce existed.

In connection with that inquiry

it was found that such grounds di d exist in favor of plaintiff.
If there was res judicata as to this factual
it would be in favor of plaintiff's claim here.
fact is that the issue of intentional
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issue,
But the

infliction of severe

emotional

distress was never

litigated

in the divorce.

Unfortunately plaintiff cannot claim that the adjudication
of that issue in the divorce is conclusive in this action.
V.
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND FOR CONSPIRACY ARE NOT BARRED
Plaintiff's attempt to set aside fraudulent conveyances
(Second Cause of Action) is, in part, companion to her attempt
to set aside the judgment on the ground that it was taken by
fraud.

If plaintiff is successful in setting aside the judgment,

and there are

fraudulent conveyances, her cause of action to

set aside fraudulent conveyances

is the only way to get the

property back. Th i s cause of act i on and the one i nvo1v i ng consp i racy
(Third Cause of Action), involve third parties who were never
parties to the divorce proceedings.

It is hoped that through

appropriate discovery such third parties can be brought within
the court's jurisdiction and they can be forced to reconvey
the properties or pay damages in lieu thereof.
Plaintiff submits that the Kilgore episode where defendant
(1) secretly

bought real

property,

(2) had

it conveyed to

Dorene Kilgore "because he did not want to have it entered in
his divorce," and

(3) took back a secret quitclaim deed which

he failed to record, and (4) after the divorce had a new quitclaim
deed prepared so he could record it in his own name, is only
one example of a fraudulent conveyance.
Defendant has flagrently and fraudulently deceived not
only the plaintiff but the Court. Through this action the plaintiff
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plans to engage in extensive discovery to uncover the true extent
of defendant's

fraud.

A Summary

Judgment

should not be used

to test plaintiff's proof.
If her pleadings are
but whether they are
on the merits.

true, then she is entitled to relief,

true can only be determined after a trial

The defendant's Motion should have been denied.
CONCLUSION

Appellant

urges that

this

court

reverse the granting

the Summary Judgment and remand this case for

of

pre-trial proceedings,

discovery and trial on the issues raised by the Complaint.

DATED this 21st day of FEBRUARY, 1985.
Respectfully submitted

Charles F. Abbott
Attorney for Appellant
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT,

MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff

"
CASE NUMBER
DATED

63,129

October 15, 1984

JOHN B. KNIGHT, e t a l . ,
Defcadint

«

J. Robert Bullock,

JUDGE

R U L I N G

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed herein on March 9,
1984, is treated as a motion for summary judgment of no cause of
action, and is granted.
In the Court's opinion the material issues sought to be
raised by the plaintiff herein were adjudicated in Civil No. 58518,
Dated this 15th day of October, 1 9 8 4 .
BY T H E ^ O U R T :

ROBERT BULLOCK, JUDGE
cc:

Charles F. Abbott, Esg.
Allen K. Young, Esq.

ALLEN K. YOUNG
YOUNG, HARRIS & CARTER
Attorneys for Defendant
350 East Center
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooc-ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

)

JOHN B . KNIGHT, e t a l . ,

)

Defendants,

C i v i l No. 63,129

)
—oooOooc—

Based

upon

above-entitled

the defendants'
matter

Motion

to Disiriss

on t h e 9 t h d a y o f M a r c h ,

now m a k e s a n d e n t e r s t h e

filed

in

the

1984, the Court

following:
FINDING OF FACT

1.
raised

The C o u r t
by

finds

that

the plaintiff

the material

herein

were

issues

adjudicated

sought

to

in C i v i l

be
No.

58518.
Based
and e n t e r s

upon
the

the foregoing

Finding

of F a c t

t h e C o u r t now m a k e s

following:
CONCLUSION OF LAW

1.
miss

The Court concludes
filed

herein

on M a r c h

that

the Defendant's

9, 1984, i s t r e a t e d

s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t of no c a u s e of a c t i o n ,

AdA-e^dc*** Vr 9—

and i s

Motion to D i s as a motion

granted.

for

DATED and SIGNED this

cay of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

J. PCSERT BULLOCK, Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Charles F. Abbott, Attorney for the above-named plaintiff, 2696
North University
Ave. Suite 180, Frovo, Utah 84601, postageg
lty A^
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AtLEN K. \0\KG
YOUNG, HARRIS & CASTER
Attorneys for Defendant
350 Esst Center
Frovo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 375-9801
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
ELIZABETH JOANNA KNIGHT,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
JOHN B. KNIGHT, et al. ,

Civil No. 63 , 129

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
Based upon the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of
Law the Court now makes and enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED:
1. That the above-entitled case is dismiss with prejudice,
no cause of action.
DATED and SIGNED this

day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Ch'arles F. Abbott, Attorney for the above-named plaintiff, 2696
North University Ave. Suite 180, Provo, Utah 84601, postageg
prepaid this ^f^
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